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Abstract 
An issue of major concern to politicians and policy-makers around the world today is whether 
transport infrastructure investments, such as those in roads and airports, generate enough 
economic benefits to justify their very large price tag. Beginning in the mid 1970s, nearly all 
OECD countries experienced a sustained decline both in public investment and in private 
sector output.  Since infrastructure comprises the vast majority of public capital in these 
countries, this led many economists to conclude that underinvestment in infrastructure was 
largely responsible for the low growth rates in output and productivity which were 
experienced by these countries.  In our paper, we discuss the findings in the literature with 
respect to both econometric and modeling deficiencies. Based on these criticisms, we develop 
a cost function modeling approach which includes public transport infrastructure capital, 
perform an econometric analysis and discuss several of our estimates of infrastructure 
productivity effects. The paper concludes that, in nearly all production sectors (except 
oil/agriculture), the public transport infrastructure investments made in Norway over the last 
20 years significantly reduced private production costs and altered demand for private inputs.  
However, we find such effects to be statistically insignificant at the aggregate level. 
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1 Introduction 
An issue of major concern to politicians and policy-makers around the world today is whether 
transport infrastructure investments, such as those in roads and airports, generate enough 
economic benefits to justify their very large price tag.  Beginning in the mid 1970s, nearly all 
OECD countries experienced a sustained decline both in public investment and in private 
sector output.  Since infrastructure comprises the vast majority of public capital in these 
countries, this led many economists (such as Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1990 a,b)) to 
conclude that underinvestment in infrastructure was largely responsible for the low growth 
rates in output and productivity which were experienced by these countries.  Our aim in this 
paper is to investigate how transport infrastructure capital, the majority of which is publicly 
owned in most countries, enters into the private production process.   We hope to find out 
whether or not there is a clear and discernible link between this particular type of public 
infrastructure and private production costs in Norway. 
 
One widely used definition of infrastructure is as the real fixed capital stock which is owned 
by the public sector.  This is a rather vague definition, but it permits easy measurement.  An 
alternative, and better definition from a theoretical standpoint, is that infrastructure includes 
all the various networks of capital intensive natural monopolies, such as highway and utility 
systems.  This is often called the ‘core’ infrastructure because it is considered most likely to 
enhance private sector production.  While this ‘core’ definition is more precise than the 
‘public ownership’ one and captures that infrastructure can be both publicly and privately 
owned, it is notoriously difficult to measure (see Gramlich, 1994).  Furthermore, available 
national accounts data rarely distinguish between private infrastructure capital and other types 
of private capital.  For these reasons, we must follow convention and define transportation 
infrastructure according to the ‘public ownership definition’, i.e. as the real fixed public 
capital stock in air, rail, road, sea, and communication activities. 
 
Even though it is intuitively obvious that production would be impossible without public 
infrastructure, classical production theory, oddly, has typically ignored this variable, focusing 
instead on only those variables internal to the firm, like private capital and labor.  
Traditionally firms are assumed to choose the optimal amount of private inputs given private 
input prices, a predetermined level of output, and various exogenous environmental factors - 
such as technological change.  Public transportation infrastructure capital, like technological 
change, can be thought of as one of those environmental factors which are external to the 
firm’s decision making process yet nonetheless influence its production possibilities, and 
thus, indirectly, its cost structure. 
 
According to Meade (1952), public capital affects output in two ways.  One way is as an 
environmental variable, as just discussed, which can boost private input productivity.  The 
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other way public capital affects output is more directly as an input which contributes 
independently to a private firm’s production.  Public capital can stand in its own right in the 
production function, even though it is not a ‘choice’ variable of the firm.  (In the simplest 
case, think of plane plus pilot plus public airport services as producing air travel services.) 
The important distinction is that public infrastructure capital is different from traditional 
inputs because it is not purchased by the firm like private inputs are.  Instead, changes to the 
stock are usually determined externally, via the political process.  Assuming that the 
individual firm has no influence in this process, public infrastructure capital should be 
considered as an exogenous, unpaid factor of production which affects the firm’s variable 
costs. 
 
A review of the literature 
A brief review of the literature demonstrates that economists are widely divided over whether 
or not public infrastructure investment generates economic returns, in terms of higher output 
or increased productivity.  The controversy is not about if public capital belongs in the 
production (or cost) function, but rather how the function should be estimated.  Important 
issues to consider are which functional form is appropriate and whether the data used are 
stationary, i.e. give reliable results.  
 
It should be noted at this point that there is an important distinction between the stock of 
infrastructure capital and the flow of services from that stock.  It is the amount of services 
which a firm receives from the infrastructure stock which influences a firm’s cost structure, 
rather than the total infrastructure capital network which exists.  Unfortunately, it is 
impossible to accurately measure the amount of infrastructure services which a firm uses.  For 
example, it is hard to measure which parts of a national highway system a firm actually uses, 
how intensely it uses these routes, and how to account for variations in road quality or 
congestion levels. The second-best solution, now standard in most of the recent literature, is 
to multiply the infrastructure capital stock by a capacity utilization index in order to reflect 
that firms utilize the available infrastructure stock to different degrees, depending on the level 
of activity in their industry.  Thus in boom periods, the firm’s demand for public transport 
infrastructure services will be relatively high, reflecting that the demand for the firm’s own 
products is large, whereas in recessions situation is obviously reversed. 
 
Assuming Cobb Douglas production technology, constant returns to scale over all inputs1, and 
using time series data, Aschauer (1989) performs a straightforward least squares regression of 
total private business economy value-added per unit of private capital on the private labor-
capital ratio, the net (of depreciation) public capital (nonmilitary) stock to private capital 
                                                          
1  CRTS over all inputs is tested and accepted by Aschauer. 
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stock ratio,2  capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector, and on time as a proxy for 
technological change. Using annual US data from 1949-1985,3  he finds that the elasticity of 
output with respect to ‘core infrastructure’, is .24 and is highly significant.4  This means that a 
1% increase in the public ‘core’ public infrastructure capital stock would generate a .24% rise 
in output.  The estimated elasticity of output with respect to private capital is .26.  Therefore, 
in Aschauer's model, public ‘core’ infrastructure capital appears to have almost the same 
impact on private sector output as private capital does.  He concludes that the government 
should take advantage of this large stimulative effect by increasing public investment in 
infrastructure.  Aschauer's work prompted many other economists to investigate whether the 
economic returns to infrastructure were really as dramatic as he claimed. 
 
Using a similar approach, Ratner (1983) had earlier estimated an aggregate Cobb Douglas 
production function, assuming constant returns to scale technology.  Ratner’s model was  
slightly different from Aschauer's model, where capacity utilization enters additively to the 
estimated equation, as an independent variable.  In his original study, Ratner finds an 
elasticity of private US business sector output with respect to public (infrastructure) capital of 
.06 over the period 1949-1973. Tatom (1991) reestimates Ratner’s model using revised levels 
data for this period and finds that the elasticity of output with respect to public (infrastructure) 
capital is .28. Tatom argues, however, that Ratner’s findings (as well as his own reestimation) 
are invalid due to the nonstationarity of the data5.  Therefore, Tatom reestimates the model 
(for the same period) after first differencing the data, which makes each of the variables 
stationary (he also includes a term for the price of energy relative to the price of business 
sector output). Once the variables are first differenced, the impact and statistical significance 
of public capital fall dramatically.  When Tatom uses the first differenced data for just 1949-
1973, the public capital coefficient changes sign to negative and becomes statistically 
insignificant.  He also reestimates the model to include the period 1949-1985 and finds that 
the elasticity of output with respect to public capital still is statistically insignificant. In 
addition, when Hulten and Schwab (1994) reestimate Aschauer's equations using first 
differenced data instead of the levels, they also find that the coefficient on public capital 
becomes statistically insignificant. They note that, "with slightly different statistical 
                                                          
2  Here, the stock of public capital is used here as a proxy for the flow of services from public capital since the 
services are assumed to be proportional to the stock.  The capacity utilization index comes in additively. 
3  A detailed discussion of the international literature is presented in APPENDIX  C. 
4  Aschauer defines ‘core’ public infrastructure as highways, mass transit, airports, utility (electric, gas, water) 
systems, and sewers.  So defined, ‘core public infrastructure’ comprises 55% of the total nonmilitary public 
capital stock. 
5
  By stationarity, it is meant that the main properties of the variable, such as its mean, variance, and covariance 
with its lagged variables do not depend on the absolute value of time, but rather on the time between periods.  
For example, after a random shock we would expect the mean of a stationary variable to return to its original 
long run trend.  For a non stationary variable, however, temporary shocks become permanent ones.  The 
problem with macroeconomic time series, in particular, is that they not only usually follow a trend (e.g. the 
means rise over time), but often even when the trend is removed, they remain non-stationary. For more on time 
series analysis see, for example, Harvey (1990),  Kennedy (1992) and Granger and Newbold (1986). 
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approaches (i.e. whether or not the data are first differenced), the same data could lead us to 
conclude that additional investment in infrastructure could have either a dramatic impact or 
virtually no impact on the private economy."  This underscores the main point here, that 
obtaining non-spurious results hinges on whether stationary data are used. 
 
Economists are not only divided over econometric issues concerning data stationarity, they 
are also divided on how to model the link between infrastructure public capital and output.  
Most studies of the effects of infrastructure capital on output use the Cobb Douglas single 
equation aggregate production function specification. This is probably due to its simplicity, 
especially with relatively few inputs, and to the fact that current research is often compared to 
earlier work, which usually employed Cobb Douglas aggregate production functions.  
Another modeling dilemma concerns whether to use a single equation approach or a 
simultaneous equation estimation. 
 
The main problem with the Cobb Douglas production function is the relationships that it 
presupposes between the inputs.  The elasticity of substitution between the different inputs are 
constant and equal to one which means ex ante that private capital, public capital and labor 
are all assumed to be substitutes.  By choosing this form, then, one has already decided 
beforehand that higher investment in public capital leads to higher marginal and average 
productivity of the other inputs.  The Cobb Douglas form, therefore, is too restrictive because 
it does not leave room for the possibility of complementarity between the inputs.6 
 
A related problem with the Cobb Douglas production function is that is presumes that all 
inputs are variable in the production process at all times.7  A more realistic assumption, of 
course, would be to model only some factors (such as material inputs and labor) as variable in 
the short run, while inputs such as private and public capital would be fixed.  The translog 
functional form could incorporate these changes.8 
 
A drawback of using a single equation estimation relates to the problem of correlation versus 
causality.  Two time series which are dominated by strong, similar trends , like output growth 
and infrastructure investment, will no doubt be correlated, but this does not necessarily imply 
that one variable indeed caused the other.  The problem here is to determine which variables 
are exogenous and which are endogenous.  It is very likely the case, for example, that the 
production function is part of a system of simultaneous equations and, therefore, that the right 
hand side variables (inputs in the standard production function estimates, like Aschauer's) like 
                                                          
6  Private and public capital are found to be complements in most  of the literature, especially in the 
manufacturing sector.  See, for example, Seitz (1994), and Berndt and Hansson (1991). 
7
  The problems with using the Cobb Douglas functional form are discussed in greater detail in Berndt and 
Hansson (1991). 
8
  The translog cost function was first introduced in Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1973). 
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labor input and capacity utilization are actually endogenously determined.  If so, then OLS 
yields biased and inconsistent estimates.  Since the endogenous variables are jointly 
determined in a simultaneous equation system, causality is not implied by correlation when 
looking at just one equation (such as the production function) in isolation.  In addition, a 
single equation approach also seems to be inadequate due to the unique nature of public 
infrastructure capital and the multi-dimensional way that it affects production.9 
 
Taking advantage of duality principles, Lynde and Richmond (1992) look at the effects that 
public capital has on US private sector (nonfinancial) production costs. Following the 
‘ownership’ definition of infrastructure, they measure public capital as the net stock of 
nonmilitary fixed government-owned capital.  Under perfect competition, the individual firm 
minimizes private production costs by choosing the optimal level of labor services and private 
capital services given the level of public capital services which are provided by the 
government at no cost to the firm10.  Lynde and Richmond use a translog cost function and 
estimate only the set of cost share equations for the period 1958-1989. They find a  negative 
and significant infrastructure coefficient in the labor cost share equation which implies that an 
increase in the provision of public capital services leads to a fall in the cost share of labor.  
When Lynde and Richmond calculate the overall effect of public infrastructure capital on the 
demand for labor (i.e. after also taking the productivity effect into account), they find that 
labor and public capital are substitutes.  They also find that private and public capital are 
complements.  The results also suggest that the marginal product of public capital is falling 
over the period.  That is, an increase in public capital services leads to an increase in its 
shadow cost share.  Nonetheless, they find that the marginal product of public capital was not 
driven below zero. In short, although Lynde and Richmond take a different methodological 
approach than Aschauer and Ratner, they also conclude that public capital is a significant 
determinant of US manufacturing sector costs.  They do not, however, discuss the stationarity 
of their data. 
 
The Norwegian case 
In contrast to the analytical studies performed thus far, most of which look at the impact of 
aggregate public infrastructure investment (i.e. which also includes utilities, sewers, schools, 
etc) on the manufacturing sector, we are interested in the effects of one particular type of 
public infrastructure, namely transport infrastructure.  This variable is particularly interesting 
to focus on because it is reasonable to assume, for example, that expenditure on a better 
highway system will have more of a direct effect on the economy than, say, building a 
hospital will. Public transport infrastructure capital is also arguably an important type of 
public infrastructure to study because it accounts for such a large part of the total public 
                                                          
9  The deficiencies of single equation models in this context are detailed in Hulten (1993). 
10   See Appendix C. 
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capital stock and public investment in most OECD countries.  In 1991, for instance, Norway’s 
public transportation infrastructure capital stock was NOK 307.3 billion (1991 prices), which 
was about 45% of the total Norwegian real fixed public capital stock (Statistics Norway, 
1994).   
 
 
Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
Transport infrastructure (public) investment
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The same year, total investment in Norwegian public transportation infrastructure was NOK 
9.2 billion (1991 prices), which was approximately 1.3% of GNP or about 7% of total 
national gross fixed capital formation (Statistics Norway, 1994).  The most dramatic change 
in transport infrastructure investment levels occurred in the post/telecommunications sector, 
as Figure 1 shows.  However, Figure 2 reveals that by far the majority of all public transport 
infrastructure investment went to the road sector.  For instance, road investment accounted for 
73% of total public investment in transport infrastructure in 1991.  This means that, for 
Norway, when we analyze the effects of public transport infrastructure investment on the 
private production process, we are primarily talking about the impact of spending on roads 
(including tunnels and bridges). 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
GDP vs. Transport Infrastructure Investment
(100,000 NOK, constant '91 prices)
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Norway stands out as an interesting case study for two main reasons.  First, Norway was one 
of the only OECD countries which did not experience a sustained decline in its public 
transport infrastructure investment after 1975 (OECD, 1960-1990).  As can be seen in Figure 
3, both Norwegian GDP and public transport infrastructure investment rose steadily between 
1962 and 1991.  This then raises the question: is there a connection between Norway’s 
steadily increasing investment in transport infrastructure and the similarly steady growth in its 
GDP?  
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A second interesting feature of Norway is its geography combined with its political objectives 
as a welfare state.  Norway is a long, thin country which contains many small coastal islands 
and which is criss-crossed by fjords all up and down the coast.  There is, therefore, a high 
demand by rural inhabitants for transport infrastructure, especially for bridges, tunnels, and 
roads, in these isolated regions.11  While it seems clear that providing a better transportation 
infrastructure network to these people would increase their welfare, it is less clear whether 
connecting these regions is justifiable on economic grounds--that is, whether the construction 
of a better public transport infrastructure network results in a ‘payoff’ in the form of lower 
private production costs in the affected regions.  Identifying a clear and discernible 
relationship between such public transport infrastructure investment and private sector cost 
reduction is, therefore, of clear importance. 
 
Using a cost function/cost share approach, we seek to model the impacts, if any, that public  
transport infrastructure capital has on Norwegian private sector (variable) costs.  We use 
annual time series data for the period 1971-1991 and examine private production costs at both 
the aggregate and sectoral level.  The paper is further structured as follows:  In section 2, the  
results of our Norwegian estimations, including elasticity estimates, are reported at the 
aggregate and dissagregate level.  Section 3 concludes with some final comments. 
 
2 Estimations 
As noted earlier, most studies about the role of public capital in the production process 
employ the broad ‘public ownership’ definition of infrastructure capital and focus on the 
United States economy. We use Norwegian time series data and focus on a particular type of 
public infrastructure capital-- transportation infrastructure (which is represented by G in our 
model).  We assume a translog cost function and estimate a set of cost share equations 
simultaneously, making sure to use stationary data.  The production and cost functions 
contain the same information according to duality principles, but we use the latter 
specification because it allows us to explicitly include input price effects and their impact on 
factor utilization.12  After obtaining results for the aggregate Norwegian economy, we re-run 
the regressions at the sectoral level, to examine the impact of public transport infrastructure 
capital on sectoral production. 
 
                                                          
11
  However, this is not necessarily reflected by a high willingness of inhabitants to pay for the services from 
these types of transport capital. 
12  For a discussion on duality and on measuring infrastructure benefits see Diewert (1986). 
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2.1  The Translog Aggregate Cost Function and Estimated Cost Share Equations for the  
 Norwegian Economy 
Suppose that, in a perfectly competitive market, each industry has a simple, well-behaved 
(variable) private cost function13  which depends on private input prices (p
K
, p
L
, p
M
), gross 
output level (Y), the amount of public transport infrastructure capital services available (G),14  
and time (as a proxy for technological change). The three private input quantities- services of 
capital (K), labor (L), and intermediates (M) - are determined conditional on the 
predetermined (by the government) public input, namely public transport infrastructure 
capital services, which is available at zero cost to firms in this simple model.  G is thus 
modeled as an exogenous unpaid factor of production which can indirectly influence the cost 
function by altering the production environment. Total cost is defined by 
 
(2.1) C p p p Y G t p L p K p M s t
K L M
K L M
L K M
( , , , , , ) min . .
, ,
= + + Y =f(K,L,M,G, t)  
 
where f(.) is a production function. We assume that fK >0, fL >0, fM >0, ft >0 and fG ≥0. 15 
 
Using Shephard’s lemma, the optimal conditional factor demands can be expressed as 
 
(2.2a) L
C
p
L
* =
∂
∂
   , 
(2.2b) K
C
p
K
* =
∂
∂
   , 
(2.2c) M
C
p
M
* =
∂
∂
   . 
 
Recalling that under perfect competition, λ* = q (output price) and using the envelope 
theorem, the following relations can be shown to hold 
 
(2.2d) 
∂
∂
C
y
q=    , 
(2.2e) 
∂
∂
C
G
qf
G
= −    . 
 
 
 
                                                          
13  Properties of the well-behaved cost function C(.)  include that it is continuous, twice differentiable, concave 
in input prices, non-decreasing in output level and linearly homogenous in input prices. 
14  Here, the transport service is assumed to be proportional to the stock of transport infrastructure capital 
multiplied with a capacity utilization index. 
15  The fG ≥0 assumption is equivalent to requiring that the cost function be nonincreasing in G, which is 
discussed below (free disposal assumption). 
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By imposing a free disposal assumption, we rule out a priori the possibility that increasing 
the amount of public infrastructure capital can increase costs.  Thus, we assume that an 
increase in G enables the firm to produce a given level of output with fewer labor, private 
capital, and/or intermediate inputs ceteris paribus.  This assumption requires that fG ≥0 (on 
the production side) or, equivalently, that CG≤0 (on the cost side) and which then implies sG 
≤0  . 
 
An alternative way of expressing the shadow price of public transport infrastructure capital is 
in terms of the adjustment costs of labor, private capital, and intermediates: 
 
(2.3) 
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
C
G
p
L
G
p
K
G
p
M
G
which by assumption
L K M
= + + ≤(
*
) (
*
) (
*
), ,0 .  
 
This shows that an exogenous change in the transport infrastructure capital stock can affect 
the private production costs by altering both the productivity of and the cost minimizing 
conditional demands for the private factors.16  Only if these effects go in the “right” direction 
(for example, if all private inputs were substitutes with respect to public transport 
infrastructure capital), will an increase in public capital services unambiguously reduce 
private production costs.  This would obviously be a legitimate argument for increasing 
infrastructure investment.  Ascertaining the production relationships between all of the 
factors, i.e. whether they are complements or substitutes, is therefore of key importance. 
 
We use a translog cost function of the form 
 
(2.4) 
ln ln . ln ln ln . (ln ) ln ln
ln . (ln ) ln ln ln ln ln . (ln )
ln ln ln ln ln ln , , ,
C p p p Y Y p Y
G G p G Y G t t
p t Y t G t i j K L M
i i
i i
ij i
j
j Y YY Yi
i
i
G GG iG i
i
YG t tt
it
i
i Yt Gt
= + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + =
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑
∑
β β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β β
0
2
2 2
5 5
5 5  
 
Substituting from (2.2(a-e)), the cost shares can be written as 
 
(2.5a) s
p L
C
C
p
L
L
L
∗
= =
*
*
ln
ln
∂
∂
 ≥ 0  (cost share of labor)  , 
(2.5b) s
p K
C
C
p
K
K
K
∗
= =
*
*
ln
ln
∂
∂
≥ 0 (cost share of private capital)  , 
                                                          
16  For example, increased investment in airports might mean that an air courier firm could deliver its packages 
faster.  Per unit costs would fall, but there might also be an indirect effect on the demand for labor and private 
capital.  The total number of pilot hours worked could fall (less need for overtime) and the planes would perhaps 
require less frequent repairs.  The individual firm therefore, adjusts its private input decisions according to 
whether each private input substitutes or complements public capital services. 
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(2.5c) s
p M
C
C
p
M
M
M
∗
= =
*
*
ln
ln
∂
∂
≥ 0 (cost share of intermediates) , 
(2.5d) s
qy
C
C
y
Y
∗
= =
*
ln
ln
∂
∂
> 0 (cost flexibility)  , 
(2.5e) s
qf G
C
C
G
G
G∗
=
−
=
*
ln
ln
∂
∂
 ≤ 0 (shadow cost share of public capital) . 
 
However, because the private factor cost share equations must sum to one only two of the 
private input share equations are independent 
 
(2.6) s s s
K L M
∗ ∗ ∗
+ + = 1   . 
 
If f(.) is homogeneous of degree one in K, L, M, G (i.e. constant returns to scale), then it can 
also be shown by Euler's Theorem, (2.5d), and (2.5e) that 
 
(2.7) s s
G Y
∗ ∗
+ = 1   . 
 
Letting the measured equivalents of the cost minimizing cost shares (*) equal SL, SK, SY and SG, 
our set of simultaneous equations is thus comprised of two of the SL, SK, SM equations and 
either the SG or SY equation.  We (arbitrarily) choose to estimate the SK ,SM and SY equations.  
The unrestricted cost share equations are then 
 
(2.8) s p p p Y G t
K K KK K KL L KM M KY KG KT
= + + + + + +β β β β β β βln ln ln ln ln ln   , 
 
(2.9) s p p p Y G t
M M MK K ML L MM M MY MG MT
= + + + + + +β β β β β β βln ln ln ln ln ln   , 
 
(2.10) s p p p Y G t
Y Y YK K YL L YM M YY YG YT
= + + + + + +β β β β β β βln ln ln ln ln ln   . 
 
The producer's choice of inputs determines the cost level at the same time, and therefore 
equations (2.4), (2.8), (2.9), and (2.10) comprise a set of simultaneous equations.  However, 
to maximize the degrees of freedom in the regressions, we estimate only the share equations 
(2.8), (2.9), and (2.10), since they will yield all the parameters in which we are interested.  
Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation is used. 
 
Conditions and Restrictions 
To ensure that the cost function is consistent with economic theory, some conditions must be 
imposed on the parameters of the share equations.  Neo-classical theory maintains that the 
cost function must be symmetric and linearly homogeneous in input prices.  For symmetry to 
hold, we require β
ij = βji. and βiy = βyi  for i, j = K, L, M, Y, G.  By Euler's Theorem, the linear 
homogeneity of the cost function implies that the share equations be homogenous of degree 0 
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in input prices. The relevant conditions affecting the share equations are then β
iK + βiL + βiM = 
0  for  i=K, L, M, Y, G.   In order for the CRTS restriction to hold, the share equations must be 
homogeneous of degree 0 in Y and G,  (i.e. β
iY
 + β
iG = 0 for i = K, L, M, Y, G). 
 
The Data 
To test for stationarity, we use Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) t-tests to check for unit roots 
in the levels variables.  A unit root here corresponds to a zero coefficient on the lagged levels 
variable, Zt-1 (coefficient β in Test A, Appendix A) and indicates a non stationary data series.  
The critical values are found in the Dickey-Fuller tables, which cover estimations with a drift 
and with a drift and time trend.17  As can be seen in the results table, for none of the levels 
variables is this β coefficient significantly different from zero.18  Thus, none of the variables 
we use are stationary in levels. 
We then perform the same tests on the first differences of the variables and report the results 
under Test B, Appendix A.  The coefficient estimates for ∆ Zt-1 (again called β) are now all 
significantly different from zero.  Therefore, all of the first differenced variables are 
stationary, I(1), perhaps some with a drift.19  Since all of the variables are of the same order of 
integration, we can proceed with the analysis using these first differenced variables and can 
interpret the estimates in the conventional manner. 
 
In accordance with the literature, the price of private capital is constructed using the user cost 
of capital formula originally developed by Jorgenson (1963) 20 
 
(2.11) p p r
K J
= +( )δ   . 
 
That is, it equals the price index of new investment (p
J ) multiplied by the sum of the interest 
rate (r) and the physical capital depreciation rate (δ).  The interest rate is proxied by the rate 
of return in the manufacturing sector and equals the operating surplus divided by the real 
capital stock in that sector.  The depreciation rate, δ,  is assumed to be .05. 21  This 
specification implies that the capital can be resold at the end of each period at no cost, and 
that corporate taxes are not taken into consideration at this stage of the analysis. 
                                                          
17  See Table 8.5.2 in Fuller (1976). 
18  The relevant ADF critical t-statistics here at 5% (reported for n=25) are approximately -3.6 when the 
constant and a trend are significant, -3.0 with only a constant, and -1.95 if neither the constant nor the trend are 
included. 
19  While, admittedly, this may not be the best or only way to make the data stationary, we feel it is better than 
not taking account of the non-stationarity at all.  A better method, beyond the scope of this paper, might be to 
find cointegrated relationships among the variables. 
20  For example, Seitz (1994), Nadiri and Mamuneas (1991), Lynde and Richmond (1992) all use this type of 
specification for the user cost of capital. An alternative specification based on interest rates which include tax 
rates is formulated in Biørn (1983). Biørn and Fosby (1980) also discuss the relationship between the capital 
depreciation structure and the user cost of capital. 
21  At the next stage of investigation, a unique depreciation rate will be calculated for each sector. 
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2.2  Aggregate Estimation Results 
Regression results (symmetry and homogeneity assumed):  
  Log Likelihood=229.30 
  () indicates coefficient restricted a priori 
 
(2.12) 
s p p p Y G t
R SER
K K L M
= − + − − − + +
− − − −
= =
. . ln . ln . ln . ln . ln . ln
( . ) () ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) (. )
. .
003 117 046 071 146 114 001
513 4 59 3 61 4 47 103 047
662 1922
 
 
(2.13) 
s p p p Y G t
R SER
M K L M
= − − + + − −
− − − −
= =
. . ln . ln . ln . ln . ln . ln
(. )( . ) ( . ) () ( . ) ( . ) ( . )
. .
002 071 093 164 162 020 004
412 3 61 4 78 386 262 220
496 0132
 
 
(2.14) 
s p p p Y G t
CR SER
Y K L M
= − − + − + −
− − −
= =
. . ln . ln . ln . ln . ln . ln
(. )( . ) () ( . ) ( . ) (. ) ( . )
. .
002 146 016 162 014 007 009
261 4 47 386 014 049 285
643 0222
 
 
Our model yields estimates which are of plausible magnitudes and sign, although they do not 
imply much of a role for public transport infrastructure capital at the aggregate level. Using 
the likelihood ratio (LR) test we find that the hypothesis of constant returns to scale over K, 
L, M, and G is not consistent with the aggregate data (LR=26.6, χ ( ) (. ) .3
2 05 7 82= ) and is 
therefore not imposed.  For the most part, the price and output coefficients are significant, and 
the goodness-of-fit statistics of the restricted regressions are acceptable.  For the sK equation 
(2.12), the estimated cost share elasticities, which measure the response of the cost shares to a 
change in input prices, are of the anticipated sign and are significant.  According to the 
results, a 1% increase in the price of private capital leads to a .12% increase in that factor’s 
cost share, while increases in the other private input prices lead to a decrease in sK.  The 
output coefficient in the same equation is negative and significant, and implies that a 1% 
increase in the output level reduces private capital’s cost share by .14%, which is referred to 
as a negative bias of scale.  Next, the infrastructure coefficient estimate suggests that 
infrastructure capital services do not affect the cost share of private capital at the aggregate 
level.  The insignificant time trend in the sK equation indicates that technological progress 
also does not meaningfully influence the cost share for private capital, ceteris paribus. 
 
Equation (2.13) similarly confirms that increases in the prices of private capital and labor 
reduce the cost share of intermediates.  The bias of scale is again significant, but here 
positive, which means that the cost share of intermediates rises with an increase in the output 
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level.  Lastly, infrastructure capital services and time again do not significantly affect the 
equation. 
 
The cost flexibility (sY) equation contains basically the same information as in the private 
input cost share equations.  In particular, the bias of scale effects are the same as discussed in 
(2.12) and (2.13) due to symmetry conditions.  The aggregate cost flexibility is also estimated 
to be independent of the output level, the amount of transport infrastructure services 
available, and time. 
 
The total elasticity of the demand for private inputs with respect to transport infrastructure 
capital is the sum of the productivity effect (sG) and the factor bias effect (
β
iG
i
s
 for i = K, L, 
M).  Whether or not public capital and each private inputs are substitutes or complements 
depends on the relative signs of these two terms.  This elasticity can be calculated at the 
sample means according to 
 
(2.15) ξ
β
iG G
Gi
i
s
s
i K L= + = , , M   . 
 
However, our results suggest that there is no significant productivity effect or factor bias 
effect from the provision of public transport infrastructure capital at the aggregate level 
within the estimation period. 
 
Conclusions from Aggregate Estimations 
To summarize, our aggregate estimation yields the following main results about the  
Norwegian economy during the sample period 1971-1991: 
 
1.  Constant returns to scale (over K,L, M, G) at the aggregate level is not 
consistent with the data at the 95% significance level. 
2.  No significant productivity effect or bias effects from transport infrastructure 
capital are found. 
 
Our results controvert those of the studies which conclude that public infrastructure capital 
plays an important role in private production.22  This difference in findings could be due to 
our focus on the aggregate level,23 our use of a specific type of public infrastructure variable 
(transport), and/or our use of stationary data.  Having found no evidence of productive effects 
from public transport infrastructure capital at the aggregate level, we now turn towards 
                                                          
22  For example, Nadiri and Mamuneas (1991) for the US manufacturing economy. 
23  Most other studies analyze only the manufacturing sector. 
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sectoral estimations in the hope that they will provide more insight as to how/whether public 
transport infrastructure capital affects private production/cost relationships. 
 
2.3  Disaggregated Estimation Results 
Oil production contributes an increasing share to Norwegian GDP (aggregate) after the late 
70s.  Whereas oil revenues were negligible in 1971, by 1991 they accounted for 14.5% of 
GDP.  However, the petroleum sector, as well as several other sectors, does not depend to a 
great degree on public transport infrastructure capital.  Conversely, it is reasonable to expect 
that the road transport sector, for instance, would be heavily dependent upon the provision of 
a good highway system.  Therefore, it was our aim that by disaggregating the data, we might 
be able to uncover the various degrees to which public transport infrastructure capital services 
can affect private sectoral costs.  By dividing the economy into six major production sectors, 
we hope to find sector-specific infrastructure effects which were not revealed at the aggregate 
level.  This is particularly important since different industries require different kinds and 
amounts of public transport infrastructure capital in the production process.24  We first divide 
the economy as follows into six major sectors, based on our a priori beliefs as to their relative 
dependence upon transport infrastructure capital: 
 
Sector A (a priori belief about G dependency level: medium) 
  Construction, excluding oil well drilling Central and Local Govt.: 
  Finance and Insurance     Education and Research  
  Wholesale and Retail Trade Central and Local Govt.: 
  Other private services     Healthcare and   
 Defense     Veterinary Services 
    Other Central and Local        
      Govt. services 
 
Sector B (a priori belief about G dependency level: low) 
  Agriculture Ocean Transport   
  Fishing and Fisheries Production and Pipeline  
  Forestry    Transport of Oil and Gas 
  Dwelling Services Oil and Gas Exploration        
      and Drilling 
 
Sector C (a priori belief about G dependency level: medium-high) 
  Manufacture of Pulp and Paper Products Manufacture of Metals 
  Manufacture of Industrial Chemicals Manufacture of Metal   
 Petroleum Refining      Products and Equipment 
  Manufacture of Consumer Goods Building of Ship and Oil 
  Manufacture of Wood, Chemical, and    Platforms 
  Mineral Products 
 
Sector D (a priori belief about G dependency level: low) 
  Production of Electricity and Gas 
 
Sector E (a priori belief about G dependency level: high) 
  Road Transport 
                                                          
24  While we have not disaggregated public transport infrastructure capital by type in this analysis, we hope to 
do so at the next stage of investigation. 
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Sector NV (a priori belief about G dependency level: high) 
  Air Transport, Rail Transport, Sea Transport, Post and Telecommunications  
 
Again, before estimating we check that the sectoral data are also stationary.  The results of 
these tests are reported in Appendix B.  Once more, none of the levels variables are 
stationary, but all of the first differenced variables are, as was the case for the aggregate 
variables.  Using the first differenced sectoral data, we then perform the disaggregated 
estimations.  The hypothesis of constant returns to scale is consistent with the data in only one 
of the six sectors:  the manufacturing sector (sector C).  Thus, only for this sector is the 
restriction imposed on the parameters.  For the other four sectors, the data reject this 
hypothesis and no CRTS restrictions are imposed on the equations.25 
 
We use the same set of simultaneous equations as before.  The LHS variables, therefore, are 
now the sectoral cost shares, instead of their aggregate counterparts.  As for the exogenous 
variables, the input prices are now sectoral, as is (gross) output level. Public transport 
infrastructure capital services, however, is not a sectoral variable because we assume that all 
of the available infrastructure services are at the disposition of any industries which want to 
use them (i.e. G is a pure public good such that consumption of services are non-rival and non 
excludable).  Letting h be an index running over the 6 production sectors, we estimate the 
following set of equations (results follow in Table 1): 
 
Unrestricted share equations (symmetry and homogeneity assumed): 
(2.16) s p p p Y G t
K h K KK Kh KL Lh KM Mh KY h KG KT
= + + + + + +
~ ~
ln
~
ln
~
ln
~
ln
~
ln
~
lnβ β β β β β β  
(2.17) s p p p Y G t
M h M MK Kh ML Lh MM Mh MY h MG MT
= + + + + + +
~ ~
ln
~
ln
~
ln
~
ln
~
ln
~
lnβ β β β β β β  
(2.18) s p p p Y G t
Yh Y YK Kh YL Lh YM Mh YY h YG YT
= + + + + + +
~ ~
ln
~
ln
~
ln
~
ln
~
ln
~
lnβ β β β β β β  
 
where 
 
(2.19) C p K p L p M
h Kh h Lh h Mh h
= + +  
(2.20) s
p K
C
Kh
Kh h
h
=  
(2.21) s
p M
C
Mh
Mh h
h
=  
(2.22) s
q Y
C
Yh
h h
h
=                 h=1, ..,6 
 
                                                          
25  The relevant LR statistics here are: 
χ χ χ χ χ χ
A B C D E NV
2 2 2 2 2 2
17 32 16 02 6 46 198 68 16 00 13 67= = = = = =. , . , . , . , . , . ,  while the critical test 
statistic is χ ( ) (. ) .3
2 05 7 82= . 
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Table 1 - Sectoral Estimation Results (1971-1991) 
Sector 
Coefficient 
Sector 
 A 
(t stat) Sector  
B 
 Sector 
C 
 Sector 
D 
 Sector 
E 
 Sector 
NV 
 
     CRTS        
BK -0,005 -(2,47) -0,007 -(1,01) -0,0002 -(0,286) -0,003 -(0,43) 0,007 (2,77) -0,006 -(2,62)
BKL -0,093 -(19,88) -0,026 -(4,39) -0,029 -(4,36) -0,053 -(7,97) -0,079 -(6,03) -0,054 -(6,33)
BKM=BMK -0,085 -(12,60) -0,261 -(4,28) -0,036 -(4,67) -0,160 -(7,44) -0,130 -(6,21) -0,052 -(5,86)
BKK= 
-BKL-BKM 
0,178 * 0,287 * 0,065 * 0,213 * 0,209 * 0,106 *
BKY=BYK -0,217 -(20,01) -0,122 -(2,67) -0,039 -(2,83) -0,252 -(9,87) -0,121 -(4,96) -0,145 -(4,21)
BKG 0,227 (8,86) -0,022 -(0,21) 0,039 * 0,288 (3,04) 0,241 (6,36) 0,161 (5,56)
BKT 0,003 (0,44) 0,024 (0,89) -0,004 -(1,06) 0,003 (0,10) -0,022 -(2,17) 0,001 (0,11)
BM 0,002 (1,15) 0,004 (0,58) -0,002 (1,22) 0,004 (0,44) -0,001 -(0,17) 0,007 (3,09)
BML -0,074 -(2,88) -0,020 -(1,30) -0,066 -(2,96) -0,033 -(2,01) -0,030 -(0,67) -0,228 -(5,22)
BMM= 
-BML-BMK 
0,159 * 0,281 * 0,102 * 0,193 * 0,160 * 0,280 *
BMY=BYM 0,233 (7,76) 0,146 (3,12) -0,102 * 0,296 (6,70) 0,068 (1,17) 0,246 (5,57)
BMG -0,106 -(4,01) 0,061 (0,56) -0,077 -(3,07) -0,244 -(1,96) -0,073 -(1,12) -0,003 -(0,10)
BMT -0,004 -(0,53) -0,011 -(0,40) -0,010 -(1,22) -0,013 -(0,38) -0,005 -(0,29) -0,018 -(2,65)
BY -0,001 -(0,26) 0,024 (1,33) -,005 -(1,68) 0,007 (0,71) 0,005 (0,86) 0,015 (1,43)
BYL= 
-BYK-BYM 
-0,016 * -0,024 * .141 * -0,044 * 0,053 * -0,101 *
BYY 0,238 (4,06) 0,147 (1,10) -,001 (0,010) 0,316 (3,28) 0,082 (1,00) 0,363 (2,31)
BYG -0,191 -(4,39) -0,488 -(1,70) ,011 * -0,163 -(1,14) -0,212 -(2,07) -0,103 -(0,81)
BYT -0,018 -(1,63) -0,034 -(0,46) 0,005 (0,530) -0,003 -(0,08) -0,003 -(0,10) -0,062 -(2,01)
LOG L 257,356  186,741 259,717 203,39 208,777  229,347
RSQ1 0,969  0,772 0,964 0,814 0,968  0,932
RSQ2 0,899  0,696 0,447 0,541 0,731  0,855
RSQ3 0,958  0,446 0,405 0,748 0,717  0,721
SER1 0,006  0,023 0,002 0,021 0,008  0,006
SER2 0,005  0,024 0,006 0,027 0,012  0,004
SER3 0,009  0,066 0,007 0,031 0,020  0,023
DW1 2,10  1,08 2,26 2,03 1,98  2,18
DW2 1,93  1,07 2,58 2,00 2,22  2,13
DW3 1,69  1,70 2,48 2,16 2,41  2,50
*=restricted a priori 
nob = 21, novar = 15 
 
Referring to Table 1 and looking first at the private capital (sectoral) share equation 
coefficients, the estimates appear to be of reasonable signs and magnitudes.  All of the 
BKL/BKM/BKK estimates are highly significant and reflect that private input prices are the most 
important determinant of private input cost shares.  We find that there are significant negative 
biases of scale for private capital (BKY) in all sectors.  Thus, as is the case at the aggregate 
level, the cost share of private capital decreases with increases in the level of output.  
Interestingly, the public capital coefficient estimates in the sK equation (BKG ) are significant in 
all sectors except B (agriculture/oil), which we had anticipated would not be heavily 
dependent upon G.  In the other five sectors, this bias effect of public capital is positive, 
which means that increasing the availability of public transport infrastructure capital services 
raises the cost share of private capital.  Lastly, technological change appears to be factor 
neutral (i.e. it does not affect private factor cost shares) in all sectors except sector E (road 
transport), where technological progress is found to reduce private capital’s cost share. 
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For the intermediate input cost share equation, all of the estimated price coefficients are 
significant, except for labor price in sectors B (agriculture/oil) and E (road transport).  The 
bias of scale estimates (BMY) are positive and significant, except for again in sector E.  Thus,  
increases in output raise the cost share of intermediate inputs in the other five sectors.  Next, 
the public transport infrastructure capital coefficient estimates are significant in two sectors--
A and C (services and manufacturing).  Contrary to our aggregate results, here we find that 
increasing the availability of public transport infrastructure capital services significantly 
reduces the cost share of intermediate inputs.  Also noteworthy is that the time coefficient is 
significant in the non-road sector (E), which suggests that the intermediate input cost share 
falls over time due to technological progress. 
 
Turning next to the sectoral SY equations, we find that cost flexibility is significantly 
increasing in the level of output in sectors A, D and NV (services, electricity/gas, and non-
road transport). The public transport infrastructure capital coefficient estimates are negative 
and significant in sectors A and E (services and non-road transport), which implies that a 1% 
increase in public transport infrastructure capital services leads to a .19% decrease in cost 
flexibility in sector A, and a .21% reduction in SY in sector E.  Lastly, the negative time trend 
is again significant in the non-road sector (E), which means that cost flexibility in that sector 
falls over time.  Using symmetry relations (BYG=BGY), we can also infer that increasing the 
output level reduces the shadow cost share of public transport infrastructure capital, i.e. SG 
falls.  This means that the marginal product of public capital (fG) rises with the output level, 
according to equation (2.5e). 
 
Using equation (2.15) which calculates the total elasticity of the (conditional) demand for 
private inputs with respect to the public input (ξiG) as the sum of a productivity effect (sG) and 
a factor bias effect, we find the following relationships between the variables. 
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Table 2 - Summary Statistics from Sectoral Regressions 
Sector sG BiasLG BiasKG BiasM
G
ξLG ξKG ξMG Conclusions 
A-Svcs. 0 -.306 .966 -.286 -.306 .966 -.286 L,G substitutes 
K,G complements 
M,G substitutes 
B-Agric. 
/Oil 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 no effect of G on 
prvt. factor demand 
or productivity 
C-Manuf. -.04 -.165 .506 -.111 -.205 .466 -.151 L,G substitutes 
K,G complements 
M,G substitutes 
D-Electr. 
/Gas 
0 -.005 .679 -.528 -.005 .679 -.528 L,G substitutes 
K,G complements 
M,G substitutes 
E-Road 
Transp. 
-.02 -.691 .873 0 -.711 .853 -.02 L,G substitutes 
K,G complements 
M,G substitutes 
NV-Non-
Road Tr.     
-.013 -.328 1.14  0 -.341 1.13 -.013 L,G substitutes 
K,G complements 
M,G substitutes 
 
Examination of the Table 2 estimates reveals some interesting information about the 
relationships between the private and public variables.  Most striking is that public transport 
infrastructure capital has no measurable impact whatsoever in the agriculture and oil sector 
(B).  For all of the other sectors, we find a complementary relationship between private 
capital and public transport infrastructure.  The other two private inputs, labor and 
intermediates, are found to be substitutes with the public input in all of these sectors. The 
productivity effect of public transport infrastructure capital is negative (i.e. cost reducing) in 
the manufacturing, road and non-road transport sectors (C, E, and NV)).  We estimate that a 
1% increase in public transport infrastructure capital services reduces manufacturing 
(variable) costs by .04%, road transport costs by .02%, and non-road transport sector costs by 
.01%.  Thus, in these sectors the mean marginal product of public transport infrastructure 
capital services is positive.  In the other three sectors, where no significant productivity effect 
was found, the total impact of G on private factor demand is just the bias effect.  Note that in 
all cases, the bias effects are much stronger than the productivity effects. 
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Conclusions from Sectoral Estimations 
The most important findings at the sectoral level are: 
1. The hypothesis of constant returns to scale is rejected for all sectors except 
manufacturing (C).  This is consistent with the literature, where many of the 
econometric studies which focus solely on the manufacturing sector find 
constant returns to scale (for example, Lynde and Richmond (1992)). 
2.  Public transport infrastructure capital is not estimated to have any effect on the 
agriculture/oil sector (B).  This is consistent with our a priori expectations. 
3. Public transport infrastructure capital and private capital are found to be 
complements in all sectors (except sector B). This shows the importance of 
disaggregation.  Labor and intermediates are estimated to substitute for public 
transport infrastructure capital in all sectors (except B).  These production 
relationships findings are basically undisputed in the literature, with the 
exception of Nadiri and Mamuneas (1991). 
4.  Public transport infrastructure capital is only found to be cost reducing in 3 
sectors:  manufacturing, road, and non-road transport, with this productivity 
effect being strongest in manufacturing. 
5. In all sectors (except B), the bias effect is much greater than the productivity 
effect, indicating that the main influence of public transport infrastructure 
capital comes via its effect on private factor demand. 
 
The only comparisons that can be made with the literature are for the manufacturing sector.26 
Our elasticity estimates for this sector of ξLG = -.205, ξKG = .466, and ξMG = -.151 are in 
accordance with the literature. For example, Lynde and Richmond (1992) find for UK 
manufacturing that ξLG = -.45 and ξKG = .71, Berndt and Hansson (1991) obtain ξLG = -.60 
and ξKG = .86 for Swedish manufacturing, and Seitz (1994) estimate that ξLG = -.138 and ξKG 
= .361 for German manufacturing (the latter two studies use ‘core’ infrastructure as their G 
variable, which is dominated by transport infrastructure capital in both countries).  Like 
Seitz’s results, our elasticity estimates fall on the low end of the literature’s range. 
 
3 Final Conclusions and Direction for Further Study 
In conclusion, our results indicate that during the sample period public transport infrastructure 
investment reduced costs in several sectors and significantly altered the demand for private 
inputs.  (The main exception to these findings is the oil/agriculture sector.)  The influence of 
public transport infrastructure investment appears to come primarily through a bias effect, 
rather than through a productivity effect.   
 
                                                          
26  As noted earlier, the literature focuses almost exclusively on the manufacturing sector. 
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Our clear finding that public transport infrastructure capital and private capital are 
complements supports the «public capital hypothesis», which suggests that public capital 
raises the marginal productivity of private capital and must be in place before private 
investment can take place.  A good public transport infrastructure network is a vital factor of 
production because it provides a conducive environment for private production.  In this 
regard, infrastructure is a necessary prerequisite for production and growth, even though  its 
quantitative effects may be quite small.  In the case of our sample period, we found that 
public transport infrastructure capital has a positive (mean) marginal product in the 
manufacturing, road, and non-road transport sectors, and that its provision led to significant, 
but relatively small cost savings there. 
 
We have shown that, almost without exception, studies like Aschauer’s which flaunt 
seemingly significant and large public capital estimates have not checked their data for non 
stationarity, thus invalidating their conclusions (assuming they used nonstationary data, which 
most time series data are).  While we feel confident that the cost function/cost share is the 
best approach to the question of returns to public capital, there still remains possible 
econometric problems to grapple with such as endogeneity of public capital, omitted 
variables, and reverse causation.  Furthermore, due to infrastructure’s unique nature, accurate 
measurement of its services will always be difficult.  In particular, we need a better way to 
measure the flows of services from the infrastructure stocks, in order that the degree of 
utilization efficiency of the infrastructure network can be taken into account.   
 
In future research work, many interesting extensions and improvements to our model could be 
made by: (a) including corporate taxation, i.e. how firms indirectly pay for the transport 
infrastructure services they use via the taxes they pay to the government, (b) modeling 
infrastructure as an impure public good, trying to capture congestion effects, (c) including 
other environmental externalities, (d) disaggregating public transport infrastructure capital by 
type (i.e. road, rail, etc.), and (e) focusing on the regional level to see whether infrastructure 
investment in the rural, ‘political-motivated’ road and tunnel projects generate less private 
cost reductions than the same level of infrastructure investment would generate in an urban 
area. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Tests for Stationarity Approx. ADF Critical Values
no const, no t = -1.95
1972-1991 const, no t = -3.0
Test A:  Levels of Variables (Z) ∆Ζ = α + β Ζ(−1) + δ Τ + ε ∆ Ζ(−1) const, t = -3.6
(t stat) 
Ζ α β δ ε CRSQ SER DW conclusion
ln (PL) -2.320 -0.321 0.008 0.513 .437 .025 1.79 non stationary
-(2.75) -(2.77) (2.55) (3.02)
ln (PK) -2.840 -0.843 -0.057 0.142 .238 .161 1.96 non stationary
-(2.30) -(2.44) -(2.14) (0.53)
ln (PM) -0.008 -0.059 0.002 0.298 .283 .033 1.96 non stationary
-(0.04) -(0.49) (0.16) (1.15)
ln (Y) 4.480 -0.261 -0.010 .579 .258 .031 2.03 non stationary
(1.93) -(1.94) -(1.72) (2.68)
ln (G) 7.120 -0.460 -0.016 0.537 .199 .041 1.66 non stationary
(2.03) -(2.05) -(1.79) (2.07)
SK 0.147 -0.658 0.000 0.406 .243 .025 1.88 non stationary
(2.93) -(2.98) -(0.28) (1.81)
SM 0.309 -0.639 0.001 0.365 .229 .014 1.91 non stationary
(2.87) -(2.90) (1.16) (1.60)
SY 0.364 -0.365 0.001 0.286 .065 .032 1.98 non stationary
(2.03) -(2.02) (0.83) (1.20)
1973-1991
Test B:  First Differences of Variables (∆Ζ) ∆∗∗2Ζ = α + β∆ Ζ(−1) + δ Τ + ε ∆∗∗2 Ζ(−1)
where ∆∗∗2 is the 2nd difference
∆ Ζ α β δ ε CRSQ SER DW conclusion
∆ ln (PL) 0.025 1.910 0.000 -0.313 .737 .029 1.99 stationary
(1.12) (4.72) -(0.29) -(1.37)
∆ ln (PK) 0.191 0.973 -0.006 -0.273 .310 .187 2.07 stationary
(1.63) (2.99) -(0.82) -(1.07)
∆ ln (PM) 0.151 1.450 -0.005 -0.285 .822 .028 2.58 stationary
(4.48) (4.47) -(3.70) -(1.41)
∆ ln (Y) -0.054 1.640 0.002 -0.188 .708 .033 2.17 stationary
-(2.29) (4.07) (1.32) -(0.80)
∆ ln (G) -0.078 1.770 0.003 -0.438 .629 .040 2.46 stationary
-(2.82) (4.99) (1.79) -(1.89)
∆ SK -0.003 1.540 0.000 -0.413 .551 .029 2.32 stationary
-(0.18) (4.45) (0.13) -(1.74)
∆ SM 0.002 1.440 0.000 -0.354 .525 .017 2.25 stationary
(0.23) (4.17) -(0.14) -(1.47)
∆ SY 0.009 1.320 0.000 -0.190 .492 .036 2.10 stationary
(0.44) (3.46) -(0.27) -(0.72)
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A PPEN DIX  B
Te sts fo r Sta tio na rity
1972-1991
Te st C :  Le ve ls o f V a ria b le s (Z) ∆Ζ = α + β  Ζ(−1) + δ Τ + ε ∆  Ζ(−1)
Ζ α β δ ε C RSQ SER DW c o nc lusion
ln(PL.A) -1,390 -0,199 0,003 0,445 ,554 ,013 1,74 non sta tio na ry
-(2,42) -(2,45) (2,00) (2,47)
ln(PK.A) -2,450 -0,725 0,049 0,512 ,284 ,130 1,78 non sta tio na ry
-(2,87) -(2,81) (2,64) (2,23)
ln (PM.A) -0,129 -0,119 0,007 0,477 ,315 ,025 1,71 non sta tio na ry
-(0,53) -(0,82) (0,63) (1,83)
ln(Y .A) 11,380 -0,690 -0,029 0,780 ,619 ,018 2,18 non sta tio na ry
(2 ,96) -(2,97) -(2,90) (2,92)
SK.A 0,126 -0,559 0,000 0,374 ,197 ,027 1,78 non sta tio na ry
(2 ,61) -(2,71) (0,43) (1,67)
SM.A 0,278 -0,758 0,000 0,515 ,334 ,012 1,75 non sta tio na ry
(3 ,46) -(2,48) (0,29) (2,38)
SY.A 0,565 -0,559 -0,002 0,400 ,204 ,032 1,76 non sta tio na ry
(2 ,71) -(2,74) -(1,32) (1,77)
ln(PL.B) -0,867 -0,099 0,008 0,234 ,234 ,038 1,36 non sta tio na ry
-(0,79) -(0,90) (0,67) (1,12)
ln(PK.B) -2,560 -0,696 0,056 0,538 ,305 ,125 1,79 non sta tio na ry
-(2,95) -(3,10) (2,78) (2,41)
ln (PM.B) 0,089 -0,029 -0,003 0,145 ,316 ,049 2,20 non sta tio na ry
(0 ,49) -(0,30) -(0,35) (0,58)
ln(Y .B) 2,090 -0,147 0,003 0,171 ,143 ,112 2,06 non sta tio na ry
(0 ,92) -(0,95) (0,56) (0,65)
SK.B 0,522 -1,040 -0,005 0,548 ,490 ,030 2,26 non sta tio na ry
(4 ,46) -(4,34) -(3,74) (2,67)
SM.B 0,430 -0,919 0,001 0,464 ,432 ,028 2,20 non sta tio na ry
(3 ,61) -(2,83) (1,34) (2,18)
SY.B 0,233 -0,311 0,009 0,265 ,021 ,078 2,16 non sta tio na ry
(1 ,82) -(1,76) (1,64) (1,07)
ln(PL.C) -3,540 -0,494 0,014 0,390 ,307 ,031 1,92 non sta tio na ry
-(2,95) -(2,97) (2,77) (2,01)
ln(PK.C) -2,580 -0,833 0,040 0,524 ,331 ,117 1,87 non sta tio na ry
-(3,21) -(3,34) (2,90) (2,31)
ln (PM.C) -0,044 -0,093 0,003 0,212 ,130 ,044 1,91 non sta tio na ry
-(0,19) -(0,64) (0,32) (0,80)
ln(Y .C) 4,930 -0,307 -0,016 0,600 ,272 ,036 1,72 non sta tio na ry
(2 ,08) -(2,10) -(1,93) (2,83)
SK.C 0,034 -0,468 0,000 0,237 ,107 ,010 1,82 non sta tio na ry
(2 ,10) -(2,29) (0,28) (1,03)
SM.C 0,303 -0,456 0,001 0,170 ,072 ,007 1,89 non sta tio na ry
(2 ,12) -(2,10) (1,89) (0,69)
SY.C 0,419 -0,395 -0,001 -0,013 ,053 ,008 1,92 non sta tio na ry
(1 ,79) -(1,79) -(1,60) -(0,05)  
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ln(PL.D) -2,410 -0,385 -0,003 0,278 ,188 ,056 1,90 non stationary
-(2,38) -(2,40) -(1,35) (1,28)
ln(PK.D) -2,640 -0,786 0,052 0,542 ,331 ,128 1,79 non stationary
-(3,17) -(3,32) (2,93) (2,43)
ln (PM.D) -1,230 -0,600 0,059 0,722 ,240 ,070 2,02 non stationary
-(2,59) -(2,81) (2,71) (2,41)
ln(Y.D) 4,330 -0,317 -0,013 0,533 ,152 ,052 1,96 non stationary
(1,81) -(1,84) -(1,49) (1,83)
SK.D 0,173 -0,384 -0,001 0,263 ,076 ,040 1,87 non stationary
(1,99) -(2,08) -(0,65) (1,12)
SM.D 0,142 -0,354 0,002 0,243 ,053 ,034 1,92 non stationary
(2,07) -(1,94) (1,12) (1,01)
SY.D 0,339 -0,747 0,007 0,498 ,275 ,046 1,66 non stationary
(2,55) -(2,77) (2,94) (1,99)
ln(PL.E) -2,240 -0,302 0,009 0,682 ,302 ,035 1,51 non stationary
-(2,05) -(2,04) (2,30) (2,99)
ln(PK.E) -2,890 -0,874 0,056 0,597 ,382 ,121 1,88 non stationary
-(3,42) -(3,57) (3,14) (2,67)
ln (PM.E) -0,006 -0,055 0,001 0,324 ,230 ,036 1,66 non stationary
-(0,02) -(0,38) (0,12) (1,17)
ln(Y.E) 2,370 -0,186 0,001 0,564 ,370 ,051 1,61 non stationary
(1,30) -(1,33) (0,25) (2,38)
SK.E 0,150 -0,501 -0,001 0,353 ,161 ,034 1,83 non stationary
(2,39) -(2,51) -(0,80) (1,56)
SM.E 0,198 -0,624 0,003 0,218 ,154 ,019 1,98 non stationary
(2,55) -(2,50) (2,12) (0,88)
SY.E 0,483 -0,799 0,008 0,532 ,364 ,026 2,05 non stationary
(3,41) -(3,47) (3,62) (2,41)
ln(PL.NV) -0,705 -0,108 -0,001 0,063 ,422 ,020 2,01 non stationary
-(0,92) -(0,99) -(0,28) (0,27)
ln(PK.NV) -2,750 -0,806 0,054 0,547 ,349 ,123 1,82 non stationary
-(3,31) -(3,45) (3,08) (2,49)
ln (PM.NV) 0,002 -0,049 0,001 0,281 ,296 ,026 1,88 non stationary
(0,01) -(0,45) (0,16) (1,08)
ln(Y.NV) 12,850 -8,890 -0,053 0,549 ,370 ,033 2,31 non stationary
(3,66) -(3,38) -(3,61) (2,50)
SK.NV 0,069 -0,463 0,000 0,378 ,167 ,017 1,75 non stationary
(2,36) -(2,47) -(0,58) (1,73)
SM.NV 0,127 -0,401 0,002 0,627 ,399 ,008 2,27 non stationary
(2,85) -(2,86) (2,80) (3,21)
SY.NV 0,672 -0,540 -0,001 0,217 ,147 ,035 2,00 non stationary
(1,71) -(1,81) -(0,55) (0,71)  
 27
1973-1991
Test D:  First Differences of Variables (∆Ζ) ∆∗∗2Ζ = α + β∆ Ζ(−1) + δ Τ + ε ∆∗∗2 Ζ(−1)
where ∆∗∗2 is the 2nd  d ifferenc e
∆ Ζ α β δ ε CRSQ SER DW conclusion
∆ ln(PL.A) 0,023 1,900 -0,002 -0,287 0,813 0,014 1,83 stationary
(1,52) (4,54) (0,00) -(0,27)
-0,930 -1,140
∆ ln(PK.A) 0,110 1,660 -0,003 -0,461 0,608 0,150 2,29 stationary
(1,19) (4,79) -(0,42) -(1,95)
∆ ln(PM.A) 0,116 1,840 -0,003 -0,421 0,835 0,021 2,47 stationary
(4,30) (5,41) -(3,31) -(2,05)
∆ ln(Y.A) -0,042 2,060 0,000 -0,446 0,731 0,026 2,45 stationary
-(2,37) (5,36) (0,40) -(1,97)
∆ SK.A -0,009 1,620 0,001 -0,430 0,584 0,03 2,38 stationary
-(0,51) (4,71) (0,55) -(1,86)
∆ SM.A 0,005 1,740 0,000 -0,516 0,649 0,013 2,54 stationary
(0,69) (5,45) -(0,78) -(2,43)
∆ SY.A 0,007 1,640 -0,001 -0,432 0,602 0,036 2,36 stationary
(0,35) (4,80) -(0,59) -(1,88)
∆ ln(PL.B) 0,137 1,710 -0,004 -0,254 0,793 0,036 1,62 stationary
(2,57) (4,99) -(1,86) -(1,27)
∆ ln(PK.B) 0,126 1,740 -0,003 -0,480 0,632 0,143 2,28 stationary
(1,40) (4,98) -(0,45) -(2,07)
∆ ln(PM.B) 0,202 1,000 -0,009 -0,062 0,803 0,044 2,35 stationary
(3,89) (3,08) -(3,50) -(0,30)
∆ ln(Y.B) -0,082 0,862 0,006 0,183 0,562 0,113 1,90 stationary
-(1,16) (2,34) (1,23) (0,73)
∆ SK.B 0,013 1,470 -0,002 -0,448 0,581 0,04 2,49 stationary
(0,53) (4,63) -(0,88) -(2,00)
∆ SM.B -0,021 1,390 0,002 -0,413 0,570 0,036 2,47 stationary
-(0,97) (4,40) (1,13) -(1,85)
∆ SY.B 0,018 0,962 0,001 0,135 0,469 0,087 1,95 stationary
(0,34) (2,51) (0,23) (0,51)
∆ ln(PL.C) 0,040 1,600 -0,001 -0,313 0,600 0,036 2,11 stationary
(1,48) (4,25) -(0,47) -(1,32)
∆ ln(PK.C) 0,093 1,600 -0,002 -0,462 0,588 0,140 2,34 stationary
(1,09) (4,69) -(0,39) -(1,94)
∆ ln(PM.C) 0,165 1,380 -0,006 -0,320 0,758 0,036 2,55 stationary
(4,65) (4,48) -(3,47) -(1,58)
∆ ln(Y.C) -0,072 1,900 0,002 -0,389 0,751 0,035 2,36 stationary
-(2,90) (5,20) (1,31) -(1,79)
∆ SK.C -0,005 1,440 0,000 -0,372 0,522 0,011 2,26 stationary
-(0,76) (4,19) (0,74) -(1,52)
∆ SM.C 0,007 1,110 0,000 -0,210 0,436 0,008 2,11 stationary
(1,59) (3,48) -(0,72) -(0,91)
∆ SY.C 0,000 0,888 0,000 -0,085 0,310 0,009 1,91 stationary
(0,01) (2,65) -(0,46) (0,51)
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∆ ln(PL.D) 0,017 1,250 -0,001 -0,052 0,441 0,067 1,79 stationary
(0,42) (2,71) -(0,51) -(0,19)
∆ ln(PK.D) 0,107 1,710 -0,002 -0,502 0,624 0,149 2,35 stationary
(1,16) (5,03) -(0,36) -(2,18)
∆ ln(PM.D) 0,120 1,700 -0,002 -0,396 0,524 0,083 1,70 stationary
(1,82) (3,36) -(0,43) -(1,30)
∆ ln(Y.D) -0,080 1,440 0,003 -0,221 0,592 0,057 1,73 stationary
-(1,79) (2,97) (1,12) -(0,81)
∆ SK.D -0,025 1,350 0,001 -0,206 0,518 0,044 2,09 stationary
-(0,92) (3,66) (0,73) -(0,82)
∆ SM.D 0,030 1,300 -0,001 -0,221 0,512 0,037 2,05 stationary
(1,32) (3,64) -(0,96) -(0,90)
∆ SY.D -0,021 1,680 0,003 -0,576 0,652 0,048 2,17 stationary
-(0,73) (5,31) (1,33) -(2,63)
∆ ln(PL.E) 0,013 2,170 0,001 -0,411 0,699 0,038 1,90 stationary
(0,51) (4,69) (0,48) -(1,50)
∆ ln(PK.E) 0,125 1,690 -0,004 -0,496 0,627 0,147 2,41 stationary
(1,36) (4,98) -(0,60) -(2,14)
∆ ln(PM.E) 0,155 1,690 -0,005 -0,404 0,848 0,027 1,91 stationary
(5,05) (5,68) -(4,13) -(1,50)
∆ ln(Y.E) -0,065 2,020 0,005 -0,417 0,786 0,05 2,28 stationary
-(1,90) (5,00) (1,98) -(1,76)
∆ SK.E -0,012 1,560 0,001 -0,370 0,558 0,038 2,28 stationary
-(0,54) (4,45) (0,39) -(1,53)
∆ SM.E 0,009 1,170 0,000 -0,278 0,393 0,022 2,17 stationary
(0,69) (3,40) -(0,28) -(0,11)
∆ SY.E 0,001 1,560 0,001 -0,406 0,590 0,033 2,30 stationary
(0,03) (4,49) (0,69) -(1,73)  
 
 29
APPENDIX C 
 
In this appendix, we describe the Lynde and Richmond model in more detail for comparative 
purposes. 
 
The Lynde and Richmond Model 
Taking advantage of duality principles, Lynde and Richmond (1992) look at the effects that 
public capital has on US private sector (nonfinancial) production costs. Following the 
‘ownership’ definition of infrastructure, they measure public capital as the net stock of 
nonmilitary fixed government-owned capital.  Under perfect competition, the individual firm 
minimizes private production costs by choosing the optimal level of labor services (L) and 
private capital services (K)  given the level of public capital services (G), which are provided 
by the government at no cost to the firm.  Thus the optimization problem is 
 
(1) C p p y G t p L p K
L K
L K
L K
( , , , , ) min
,
= + s. t.  y = A(t) f(L,K,G) , 
 
where A(t) represents technological change, which is assumed to progress with time 
( ( ) )′ >A t 0 , and y is (value-added) output. 
 
Using the envelope theorem then yields the shadow price of public capital  
 
(2) 
∂
∂
λ
C
G
A t f
G
= − ( )  , 
 
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier.  (2)  reflects the willingness to pay for an additional unit of 
public capital services or, equivalently, the private production cost savings which result from 
the provision of an additional unit of public capital. 
 
Public capital’s ‘shadow cost share’ can therefore be expressed as 
 
(3) s
qA t f G
C
G
G
=
−
⋅
( )
( )
 , 
which is analogous to the standard private cost share expressions: s
p i
C
for i K L
i
i
= = , . 
Since perfect competition is assumed, λ equals the price of output, q.  The cost function, C(.), 
is homogeneous degree 1 in pL and pK and, under constant returns to scale (CRTS), also in y 
and G.  Equation (3) shows that if the marginal product of public capital is positive (fG>0), 
then public capital ‘subsidizes’ production (i.e. has a negative shadow price), and thus sG 
must be negative. 
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Lynde and Richmond use a translog cost function and estimate only the set of cost share 
equations using the iterated Zellner SURE (Seemingly Unrelated Regressions) estimation 
method for the period 1958-1989.  We report below Lynde and Richmond’s estimates under 
price homogeneity, CRTS, and symmetry.  (Note that they include a dummy variable, DUM, 
to account for an outlying data point in 1974.) 
 
(4) 
s
C
p
p p y G t DUM
R DW
L
L
L K
= = + − + − − −
− − − −
= =
∂
∂
ln
ln
. . ln . ln . ln . ln . .
( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . )
. .
127 161 161 159 159 004 298
7 31 43 75 43 75 1185 1185 22 44 25 32
993 1392
 
 
(5) 
s
C
G
p p y G t DUM
R DW
G L K
= = − + − + + +
− −
= =
∂
∂
ln
ln
. . ln . ln . ln . ln . .
( . )( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . )
. .
368 159 159 342 342 009 268
5 67 1185 1185 3 75 3 75 7 36 6 83
919 1462
 
 
The negative and significant infrastructure coefficient in the s
L
 equation implies that an 
increase in the provision of public capital services leads to a fall in the cost share of labor.  
When Lynde and Richmond calculate the overall effect of G on the demand for labor (i.e. 
after also taking the productivity effect into account), they find that labor and public capital 
are substitutes.  They also find that private and public capital are complements.  The 
infrastructure coefficient in the s
G
 equation is significant and positive, suggesting that the 
marginal product of public capital is falling over the period.  That is, an increase in public 
capital services leads to an increase in its shadow cost share (by (3), for sG to be rising, the 
marginal product of capital must be falling).  Nonetheless, they find that the marginal product 
of public capital was not driven below zero, since s
G
 is negative over the whole sample 
period.  In short, although Lynde and Richmond take a different methodological approach 
than Aschauer and Ratner, they also conclude that public capital is a significant determinant 
of US manufacturing sector costs.  They do not, however, discuss the stationarity of their 
data, which is where our study deviates from theirs. 
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